In his 11-page order dated June 9, Munson said the court finds that the allegations in the defendant’s motion do not reasonably call into question his impartiality.
“Most of the allegations are not supported by facts. None are directed at a party and none are based on extrajudicial conduct,” Munson said.
“I cannot, in good conscience, recuse myself from a case just because a party that is dissatisfied with my rulings claims bias,” Munson added.
On April 24, the three defendants were convicted by a jury for conspiracy to commit offenses against the U.S., wire fraud and theft concerning a program receiving federal funds.
The defendants later filed a motion to disqualify Munson from all additional proceedings in the case.
The defendants claimed that Munson had an ex-parte communication with a prospective juror/government witness, Joseph Muna Fejeran.
But Munson said Fejeran contacted the clerk of court to be excused.
The clerk of court instructed Fejeran that he would not be excused because the summons was for a new jury pool and not just for a jury selection.
The defendants also claimed that Munson’s treatment of evidentiary matters during the trial amounted to biased conduct.
They said the judge ruled incorrectly on the defendants’ evidentiary objections, made biased comments regarding defense counsel’s cross examination efforts and assisted the prosecution in admitting evidence.
Munson said these allegations were not supported by facts.
He added that evidentiary objections must necessarily be sustained or overruled, and judgment is one of law and does not reflect the judge’s personal feelings toward the attorneys.
The defendants further claimed that Munson made comments during the defense counsel’s cross examination.
Munson said this supposed biased conduct was not directed at the defendants and was not “extrajudicial” — it did not reasonably implicate his impartiality.
Reacting to the defendants’ criticism of his courtroom management, Munson said: “A courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court.”
He said the case was a criminal prosecution of one of the highest public officials in the CNMI, his sister and his brother-in-law.
“It was a case of heightened public scrutiny, concern and emotion,” he said.
Munson added that the court had two additional U.S. Marshals for the duration of the trial to ensure the safety of the jurors, the court, the parties, the public, and the integrity of the jury by avoiding any potential for untoward jury interaction with the parties, the lawyers or the court.
Munson stated that on the first day of the trial, members of the public sat in their vehicles in the parking lot opposite the courthouse yelling obscenities and making obscene gestures at the courthouse.
Munson said during closing arguments, he was informed by defense counsel David Lujan that the public was concerned that the government witnesses and their families were being given preferential treatment.
The defendant’s allegation that the Marshals’ presence implied to the jury that Munson perceived the defendants to be a threat to the jurors was purely speculative and unconvincing, the judge said.
In answer to the complaint that the members of the public were not allowed to chew gum in the courthouse, were required to sit properly and stick to the designated seating areas, Munson said one of the functions of the Marshals is to enforce courtroom rules.
Munson said if the defendants meant to imply that their friends and family were not able to observe the proceedings, this was not true because the courtroom was equipped with multiple large-screen, high-definition monitors.
“The defendant’s motion that my courtroom management is biased fails because it is purely speculative,” he added.
