A partial retreat in the region could backfire, flaming tensions and emboldening China’s aggression.
As the prospect of a US-China military conflict hangs over the Asia-Pacific region, some analysts call for the American military to pull back. These include Jennifer Kavanagh, who advocated this position in The Interpreter last month. While not without its merits, this idea has some problems.
Immediately at issue is where to delineate the new US defense perimeter. A complete abandonment of US forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific region – no more US bases, alliances, or “freedom of navigation” patrols – would remove the single greatest obstacle to PRC expansionism, inviting increased Chinese bullying and likely raising the risk of multiple military conflicts breaking out due to China’s many disputes with its regional neighbors.
Hence the idea of a partial US retrenchment. Potential questions arise, however, no matter how the line is re-drawn. Kavanagh’s particular approach has the United States abandoning its security assistance to Taiwan and ending its alliances and basing arrangements with South Korea and Australia (they would “manage their own defense”). She advocates, however, that the United States continue to maintain military bases in Japan and the Philippines.
Leaving liberal democracy Taiwan alone to face forcible annexation by its much larger authoritarian neighbor would be a political tragedy – Hong Kong times ten, and also an outrage against the principle of self-determination – as well as a strategic setback for the region. Despite other Asian governments officially adopting the “one China” policy at Beijing’s insistence, they would be alarmed to see China violently subduing a neighbor. As new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently expressed (eliciting a vicious Chinese response), Japan in particular would perceive its security as greatly diminished if Beijing controlled Taiwan.
Calling for weakened US security cooperation with South Korea and Australia to mollify China makes little sense. The American military presence in South Korea poses little threat to China. This presence has a separate primary rationale, which is deterring an attack on the South by hostile neighbor North Korea. Consisting mostly of ground forces, they would have little usefulness in a Taiwan Strait scenario.
Similarly, there is no legitimate reason for Beijing to see a strong US-Australia defense relationship as threatening to any PRC strategic interest other than possible Chinese hopes of establishing a sphere of influence in the South Pacific. Australia is very far from even the shakiest Chinese territorial claims. On the other hand, the Chinese intentions implied by efforts to secure a naval base in the area and the recent brusque PLA Navy exercise in the Tasman Sea amply justify Canberra’s desire for a defense partnership with the United States to offset Beijing’s power projection potential.
At the same time, however, Kavanagh would leave US forces “in select strategic locations” in the Philippines. If the goal is to pull back US forces so that China feels more comfortable, this is a glaring inconsistency. The United States recently deployed advanced US anti-ship missile batteries in “strategic locations” in northern Luzon that could target Chinese warships menacing either the Philippines or Taiwan. The PRC government called the missile deployment “provocative and dangerous”. More generally, keeping the Philippines within the re-drawn US defence perimeter ensures that the South China Sea remains a US-China flashpoint. Some analysts have argued a war is more likely to break out there than in the Taiwan Strait.
Advocates of retrenchment also argue that the US military buildup in the western Pacific is making war more likely. Kavanagh specifies that “efforts to increase the US military presence along the first island chain may be contributing to growing tensions and instability in the Western Pacific”.
This framing overlooks the PRC actions to which the United States has been reacting, including a rapid and massive buildup of China’s armed forces in the absence of any visible military threat to China; and increasingly aggressive Chinese attempts to unilaterally enforce expansive, often unlawful and in some cases growing territorial claims across wide swaths of China’s periphery.
The call for a removal of US hard power from the region assumes the PRC would be less aggressive as a result. That is far from certain. With its near-paranoid one-party dictatorship and deep sense of both entitlement and historical grievance, China arguably fits the criteria of what international relations theorists call “greedy states”, which expand due to domestic political pathology or lack of institutional restraint rather than actual security fears.
Kavanagh and others argue that America could yield some ground and still deny China hegemony over the Asia-Pacific. A better goal is to limit China’s ability to force its strategic, economic and political agenda upon its regional neighbours wherever possible – especially where friendly countries are willing to do more for themselves to ease the burden on America. Seoul has committed to raising its defence spending to 3.5% of GDP; Taipei has pledged 5%.
US security policy in the Asia-Pacific is certainly not above reproach. Right-sizing it, however, should be maximally thoughtful, weighing whether cutting off friends and partners is likely to achieve the target objectives rather than simply emboldening more aggressive behaviour from China. Unfortunately, some degree of persistent tension may be the price of holding off PRC domination.
