However, if I attempt greater precision in describing my present activity, I come to the realization that the writer does not actually write or speak in “words” (or “sentences”), since such inscriptions are instances of abstractions — the “words” are universals distinct from any concrete exemplification of the “word.”
Bertrand Russell, in his classic work, “Analysis of Mind,” states the point clearly: “Let us consider what sort of object a word is when considered simply as a physical thing, apart from its meaning. To begin with, there are many instances of a word, namely all the different occasions when it is employed. Thus a word is not something unique and particular, but a set of occurrences….”
For example, in the above paragraph there are three occurrences or instances of the word, “word.” But there is only one word, “word” which occurs three times.
Philosophers, in order to mark the distinction between the abstract entity, known as a “word” and any concrete instance of the word have used the expressions “Types” in contrast to “Tokens.” A concrete physical event that is an instance of a word is called a token of a word while the word itself is called the type of that token. Other expressions in use are “Sign-design” in contrast to “Sign-event” to mark the same distinction as Type in contrast to Token, respectively. Thus when a person writes or speaks he or she is using tokenings of words and sentences and not the words and sentences themselves.
This simple distinction between words and their instances, between “types” and “tokens” is indicative of deep problems in philosophy. Types are sets of occurrences and the occurrences are members of sets (or classes). The question arises over the nature of the existence of such sets or classes. Those who hold that only particulars (or tokens) exist are known as “Nominalists.” Those who believe that “types” exist over and above their concrete tokens are known as “(Platonic) Realists.” A middle ground between these two are known as “Conceptualists.” As such, the debates go on.
In ordinary, everyday communication and expression we seldom make the distinction between words and their instances. This evidently does no harm. The sounds we make and the patterns we form manage quite well without fine distinctions. It is only when the attempt is made to understand the detailed nature of language that uncommon distinctions seem necessary.
Those Nominalists who maintain that words are nothing above their individual instances must explain how one instance of a word may be identical to another instance. This is usually done by recourse to the notion or “similarity” or “resemblance.” One instance, say of the token “cat” is related to another instance of the word “cat” by a “resemblance” of shape or sound. Those of you who have experience in responding to computer generated recordings on the telephone may see the inadequacy of this notion when it comes to practical applications. Moreover, the relation of resemblance breaks down on the level of morphology when we consider thoughts expressed in different languages. “Ein gutes Gleichnis enfrischt den Verstand,” in German is the same thought as “A good smile refreshes the intellect,” in English, but in purely physical terms the token sentences do not resemble one another. Thus one is led to the concepts of meaning and thought and a theory of mind.
Those (Platonic) Realists who posit a level of reality to sets, classes, and Types, are generally led to a kind of linguistic idealism, as if the system of language has a kind of existence independent of mind; a system of which humans partake, as opposed to invent. New expressions are discovered rather than created.
The philosophy of language remains intense field of research in many disciplines, and much remains to be discovered.
Puzzle
Can you move a single numeral in the following expression to make it a true statement: 101 – 102 = 1?
Answer to last week’s puzzle
The number is 707^2 = 499849
