BC Cook
THE following article is an excerpt by James Goldrick, a retired Australian admiral and fellow at the Lowy Institute, a thinktank focusing on Pacific security. It has been edited for length.
“Even if the current strategic environment is not a return to the days of the Cold War, there are consequences of China’s increasing naval capabilities and its efforts to change the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific which are forcing a return to the practices of that period. One is that the [Chinese navy] has a growing force of ships designed and equipped to collect intelligence and it is sending them increasingly far afield and for longer periods.
“For nearly 40 years until the collapse of the Soviet Union, every naval operation or exercise was conducted in the expectation that it would be monitored by intelligence gatherers at, under and over the sea, by signals intelligence stations ashore and, to an increasing extent, by sensors in space. Such activities were never one-way and Western forces monitored those of the Communist bloc just as assiduously. All on both sides tried hard to avoid giving anything away.
“Now, increased computing power brings increased detection and analytical capabilities. Big Brother is out there. Intelligence gatherers have a much greater capacity to hear and understand. Commanders therefore need to evolve new ways of operating under such watchful eyes, as well as returning to many of the customary practices of the past.
“Nevertheless, despite the heightened awareness that it brings of others who have very different aims than ours, intelligence gathering at sea is not in itself a cause of conflict when simple rules are followed. If a shadowing unit does not operate in a way that physically impedes the activities of the units it is monitoring its presence can be accepted. Indeed, the less that an intelligence gatherer hinders the operations of its subjects, the more information it can collect.
“Ironically, the customary presence of a foreign intelligence gatherer can also contribute to a better understanding between the mariners of different nations — familiarity in such cases can breed not contempt, but mutual respect. The real problem is whether China will come to understand that the rules apply in both directions. All nations know that such operations are illegal inside another country’s 12 nautical mile territorial sea, but China has its own interpretation of other elements of the Law of the Sea. Chinese units should not freely enter the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other nations to gather military intelligence if China will not accept that the same activities may be conducted by foreign units inside China’s own EEZ. Furthermore, China cannot get around the contradictions in its present policy by declaring unreasonable claims to territorial waters as it has done in the Paracel islands and may attempt in the Spratlys.”
Goldrick and I agree on many things. One, China intends to expand its economic, political and military role in the Pacific. Two, the increasing activity will lead to an old fashioned, Cold-War style environment between China and the United States. And three, the South China Sea is and will continue to be a flash point in international relations. These are not academic guesses, they are the new reality in the Pacific.
BC Cook, PhD lived on Saipan and has taught history for over 30 years. He is a director and historian at Sealark Exploration (sealarkexploration.org)