Language is an instrument that evolved under the exegeses of practical challenges in the immediate environment. Only in the later stages of our evolution were words developed to denote the instrument itself or the users of that instrument. For example, it took intelligence to invent the word “intelligence.”
The word “perception” is sometimes used in a wide and loose sense that is practically synonymous with the word “consciousness.” Thus we may confront questions such as, “What are your perceptions of the situation?” Or, “How do you see it?” Here we are using “perception” or “see” in a way that includes cognitive and affective factors such as “opinion” or “evaluation” or “judgment” and goes beyond the basic, factual and non-cognitive way I am using the term in this series of articles when I talk about “conscious perception” or “conscious visual perception.” Many so-called mental terms, such as “see,” “point-of-view,” “perspective,” “feeling,” appear to have double senses and uses depending upon whether they refer to basic physical or mental processes or to an intellectual assessment. We may say there are basic factual uses of such terms, as well as a derivative metaphorical use.
Glancing at the dictionary, we find: “Perception. 14th Century, from the Latin, Perceptio…3a: Awareness of the elements through physical sensation. Syn: Discernment.” We also have related terms such as “depth perception,” or “extrasensory perception.” On the other hand, “Sensation” is defined as “a mental process due to bodily stimulation…. Awareness due to stimulation of a sense organ…the cause or the object of sensation…cf. PERCEPTION.” We go around in circles. Perhaps the phrase “sense perception” best signifies my use. Also the relationship “being aware of” is suitable. Let A stand for the relationship between a person, or perceiver, p, and let o stand for the object or objects of awareness. Then “pAo” could stand for the nature of our conscious perceptual awareness.
Into the conceptual fog that seems endemic to our ordinary, pre-theoretic but heroic attempts to describe the describer, let us take a brief look at the subject of psychology. Therein the concepts of sensation and perception are central topics of research. Richard Wollheim, in “On the Emotions,” notes that sensation and perception are “mental states.” Examples of perception are “hearing the dawn chorus” or “seeing a constellation of stars overhead.” Examples of sensation are “pains, and itches, and pangs of hunger or thirst.” Here Wollheim is using the term “sensation” in a narrow sense, as applying to our awareness of the internal states of our own body. In other studies, this type of sensation is called “proprioception” as opposed to “exteroception” which is sensation dependent on, or perception of, objects external to our bodies. The fact is that we are “sentient” creatures and our contact with the external world is through our senses: traditionally, seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling. Thus, for us, sensation is just as pervasive as perceiving.
We awaken, open our eyes, and lo, the world is there. This is so commonplace that we do not think of special terms to describe our ordinary state of awareness. Here everyday consciousness, sensation, and perception seem to coincide. Yet often we use the word “sensation” to describe a feeling or perception that is out of the ordinary, something that especially gets our attention. Yet actually, sensation does not have to be sensational to be sensation. It is an ordinary and necessary feature of our perceptual consciousness.
Characteristics of all mental states are subjectivity, which I discussed in a previous article, and intentionality. Intentionality is the “directedness” of mental states; their reference to objects or states of affairs. Hence we may ask of any perception or sensation, what is its object or reference.
If we glance at the first psychology book ever written; namely Aristotle’s, “On the Soul,” (Di Anima) we find him saying that the general objects of sensation are the sensible, and likewise, the objects of perception are the perceptible. Objects that are perceptible to only one sense are called special for that sense. Thus for the sense of vision, the special object is color, hearing, sound, etc. He notes that it is possible to be mistaken about “what” is colored or “where” it is but it is impossible to be mistaken about the special sense object before oneself. Nowadays we might say that the sensory quality perceived is the immediate indubitable object of perception.
After this glance at the relevant conceptual landscape of perception, and its muddy waters, I want to remind our readers of R. D. Smith’s definition of illusion. “The term ‘illusion’ is to be understood as applying to any perceptual situation in which a physical object is actually perceived, but in which that object appears other than it really is, for whatever reason.” Now the question arises, What is it that appears other than it really is? It is not nothing. It has real sensory qualities. For example, suppose by altering the medium, or a malfunction of my visual system, I perceive a house that was painted in a tan color as one painted in a red color. Then what is the red house I am immediately perceiving? The red is just as red as when I truly perceive a red house. The answer to this question has taken many guises through the century. But since I am now out of space and time, I will wait until next week to discuss some surprising implications arising from this situation. We will see that a coherent account of our perceptual consciousness depends on the understanding of the tradition that makes a clear distinction between “sensation” and “perception.”
Puzzle
In 1882 Sam Loyd offered a $1000 prize for the solution to this puzzle: Given the following seven numbers and eight dots, can you make them equal to 82?: .4.5.6.7.8.9.0
Here you must realize that a dot over a number means an infinitely repeating decimal, e.g., .97 with dots over the 9 and 7 means .979797…, and so on. Out of millions of attempts, only two people were able to solve the puzzle. Can you solve it?
Answer to last week’s puzzle
Including Jazmin, there were 13 people on the carousel.
