In his order issued on July 2, Associate Judge Perry B. Inos said John F. Furey had already completed all the terms of his sentence, and vacating his conviction would not serve the ends of justice.
The defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement with the government on Aug. 22, 2007, pleading guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol.
He was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment, and placed on one-year probation.
He was also ordered to pay a fine of $600, a $25 court assessment fee, a $90 probation fee and was ordered to attend an alcohol information class. His driver’s license was suspended for 30 days.
After completing his conviction, the defendant asked the court to set aside his conviction and allow him to withdraw his guilty plea to prevent “manifest injustice.”
He said prior to his conviction, he and the opposing counsel agreed upon a disposition which would have allowed the court to vacate his conviction after a successful completion of probation.
But according to the court, “a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed, and a criminal defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.”
Inos added, “A plea of guilty is, and should be, considered by itself as a conviction of the highest order, constituting an admission and confession of guilt.”
There is “manifest injustice,” Inos said, when the guilty plea was involuntarily offered, without assistance of counsel, without understanding of the nature of the charges, after the failure of the court to establish a factual basis for the plea, or as a result of procedural errors by the court.
None of these circumstances apply to Furey’s case, the court stated.
